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The pernicious effects of misinformation were starkly exposed 
on January 6, 2021, when a violent mob of protestors stormed the 
nation’s capital, fueled by false claims of election fraud. As policy-
makers wrestle with various proposals to curb misinformation 
online, this Article highlights one of the root causes of our vulnera-
bility to misinformation, specifically, the epistemological prioritiza-
tion of sight above all other senses (“ocularcentrism”). The increas-
ing ubiquity of so-called “deepfakes”—hyperrealistic, digitally al-
tered videos of events that never occurred—has further exposed the 
vulnerabilities of an ocularcentric society, in which technology-me-
diated sight is synonymous with knowledge. This Article traces the 
evolution of visual manipulation technologies that have exploited 
ocularcentrism and evaluates different means of addressing the is-
sues raised by deepfakes, including the use of copyright law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its unholy beginnings in pornography, deepfake technol-
ogy has, understandably, been the subject of widespread criticism 
and outrage. Broadly speaking, a “deepfake” is a hyperrealistic 
video that has been digitally altered to depict an event or events that 
never occurred.1 At the individual level, pornographic and other 
harmful kinds of deepfakes can cause significant psychological and 
reputational harm.2 At the collective level, the dissemination of 
deepfakes affects our ability to differentiate authentic from inau-
thentic content, rendering us more vulnerable to misinformation.3 
This effect, however, is not limited to deepfakes; photographs and 
videos have long been vulnerable to manipulation. The problem, 
then, is not deepfakes per se, but our uncritical and disproportionate 
reliance on technology-mediated sight, and our insistence that see-
ing is believing. The initial purpose of this Article is to understand 
the historical persistence of “ocularcentrism,” or the epistemologi-
cal prioritization of sight above other human senses,4 and, secondly, 
to situate deepfakes within this social history—do deepfakes repre-
sent the limit of our tolerance for visual manipulation, and if so, 
why? Do they truly threaten visual truth in a way that earlier 
 
1 Mika Westerlund, The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, 9 TECH. 
INNOVATION MGMT. 39, 40 (2019).  
2 See, e.g., Anne Pechenik Gieseke, “The New Weapon of Choice”: Law’s Current 
Inability to Properly Address Deepfake Pornography, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1479 
(2020). 
3 See, e.g., Nina I. Brown, Deepfakes and the Weaponization of Disinformation, 23 VA. 
J. L. TECH. 1, 2 (2020); Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth 
Decay: Deep Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National 
Security, 78 MD. L. REV. 882, 883–84 (2019); Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: 
When Seeing Isn’t Believing, 27 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH.  51, 52 (2018). 
4 See, e.g., Jenni Lauwrens, Can You See What I Mean? An Exploration of the Limits 
of Vision in Anti-Ocularcentric Contemporary Art, 47 DE ARTE 26, 28 (2012); Martin Jay, 
Scopic Regimes of Modernity, in VISION AND VISUALITY 3, 3 (Hal Foster ed., 1988), 
MARTIN JAY, DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
FRENCH THOUGHT 3 (1993).  
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technologies have not? If so, should we abandon ocularcentrism—
or cling to the credibility of visual evidence? 
To date, existing scholarship on deepfakes has failed to differ-
entiate between, and tailor solutions for, the individual and collec-
tive harms associated with their dissemination. Such tailoring is 
needed to preserve the substantial utility that deepfakes offer. Deep-
fake audio recreated the speech that John F. Kennedy intended to 
deliver shortly before his assassination, using recordings of 831 
speeches he delivered in his lifetime, and offering hope to patients 
who have lost their voices to illness.5 Researchers have used deep-
fake technology to create animated, photorealistic avatars of de-
ceased persons and portrait subjects.6 Museum visitors can interact 
with life-size deepfakes of long-dead artists, constructed from ar-
chival footage.7 Deepfake technology can be used to anonymize vul-
nerable sources,8 generate multilingual voice petitions,9 produce 
synthetic MRI images that protect patient privacy,10 synthesize news 
 
5 JFK Unsilenced, CEREPROC, https://www.cereproc.com/en/jfkunsilenced 
[https://perma.cc/K7BB-3B4U].  
6 Egor Zakharov et al., Few-Shot Adversarial Learning of Realistic Neural Talking 
Head Models, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2019 IEEE/CVF INT’L 
CONFERENCE ON COMP. VISION 9459, 9459 (2019); Westerlund, supra note 1, at 41–43. 
7 Dami Lee, Deepfake Salvador Dalí Takes Selfies with Museum Visitors, THE VERGE 
(May 10, 2019, 8:50 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/10/18540953/salvador-dali-
lives-deepfake-museum [https://perma.cc/9M8P-T975]. 
8 Rebecca Heilweil, “How Deepfakes Could Actually Do Some Good,” VOX (June 29, 
2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/6/29/21303588/deepfakes-
anonymous-artificial-intelligence-welcome-to-chechnya [https://perma.cc/4THG-UL 
MQ]. 
9 Guy Davies, David Beckham ‘Speaks’ 9 Languages for New Campaign to End 
Malaria, ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019, 12:51 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/ 
david-beckham-speaks-languages-campaign-end-malaria/story?id=62270227 [https://per 
ma.cc/XQ7Q-C3DQ]; see also Kim Lyons, An Indian Politician Used AI to Translate His 
Speech into Other Languages to Reach More Voters, THE VERGE (Feb. 18, 2020, 5:35 PM),  
https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/18/21142782/india-politician-deepfakes-ai-elections 
[https://perma.cc/Y8DM-N7PZ]. 
10 Hoo-Chang Shin et al., Medical Image Synthesis for Data Augmentation and 
Anonymization Using Generative Adversarial Networks 1 (Sept. 13, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.10225. 
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reports,11 improve video-game graphics,12 reverse the aging pro-
cess,13 re-animate old photos,14 and elevate fanfiction.15 If, like most 
forms of technology, deepfakes are capable of both beneficial and 
harmful use, how should the technology be regulated to maximize 
its utility and minimize its harm? 
 
11 Simon Chandler, Reuters Uses AI to Prototype First Ever Automated Video Reports, 
FORBES (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/ 
2020/02/07/reuters-uses-ai-to-prototype-first-ever-automated-video-reports/?sh=35d9aa8 
7a2a7 [https://perma.cc/PG2G-KX2S]. 
12 James Vincent, Nvidia Has Created the First Video Game Demo Using AI-Generated 
Graphics, THE VERGE (Dec. 3, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2018/12/3/18121198/ai-generated-video-game-graphics-nvidia-driving-demo-neurips 
[https://perma.cc/F864-AHVN]. 
13 Jacob Kastrenakes, When Diplo and The Strokes Need a Deepfake, They Go to This 
Guy, THE VERGE (Mar. 4, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/ 
3/4/21164607/the-fakening-deepfakes-strokes-diplo-memes-music-industry-elon-musk-
jeff-bezos-star-trek [https://perma.cc/ZJ9Q-YLGX].  See also The Strokes, The Strokes – 
Bad Decisions (Official Video), YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=5fbZTnZDvPA&t=9s [https://perma.cc/9BVU-B8FY]. 
14     Alex Hern, Deep Nostalgia: 'Creepy' New Service Uses AI to Animate Old Family 
Photos, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2021/mar/01/deep-nostalgia-creepy-new-service-ai-animate-old-family-photos 
[https://perma.cc/BG5L-5UG3]  
15 See, e.g., Jay Peters, This Disturbingly Realistic Deepfake Puts Jeff Bezos and Elon 
Musk in a Star Trek Episode, THE VERGE (Feb. 20, 2020, 3:35 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2020/2/20/21145826/deepfake-jeff-bezos-elon-musk-
alien-star-trek-the-cage-amazon-tesla [https://perma.cc/6ZXE-NG43]; Chaim Gartenberg, 
Deepfake Edits Have Put Harrison Ford into Solo: A Star Wars Story, for Better or for 
Worse, THE VERGE (Oct. 17, 2018, 3:37 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/ 
10/17/17990162/deepfake-edits-harrison-ford-han-solo-a-star-wars-story-alden-ehren 
reich [https://perma.cc/3WK6-8W6B]; KC Ifeanyi, According to this Deepfake, Neo 
Taking the Blue Pill in ‘The Matrix’ Would’ve Been ‘Office Space’, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 
19, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90465563/according-to-this-deep-fake-neo-
taking-the-blue-pill-in-the-matrix-wouldve-been-office-space [https://perma.cc/2VEN-
2GVY]; Lee Moran, Jon Snow Says Sorry for ‘Game of Thrones’ Finale in Convincing 
Deepfake, HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2019, 9:18 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/ 
entry/game-of-thrones-deepfake-jon-snow_n_5d038623e4b0985c419bded2 [https://per 
ma.cc/4F59-XKHQ]; Zack Sharf, The Shining Deepfake Goes Viral with Jim Carrey 
Starring as Jack Torrance, INDIEWIRE (July 10, 2019, 12:14 PM), 
https://www.indiewire.com/2019/07/the-shining-jim-carrey-deepfake-video-viral-
1202156857/ [https://perma.cc/JT8B-XZND]; Sven Charleer, Family Fun with Deepfakes. 
Or How I Got My Wife onto The Tonight Show, MEDIUM (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/family-fun-with-deepfakes-or-how-i-got-my-wife-onto-
the-tonight-show-a4454775c011 [https://perma.cc/X9YP-VGJL]. 
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This Article will explore this question through the lens of copy-
right law and policy. The creation of deepfakes depends heavily on 
access to, and manipulation of, audiovisual content—much of which 
is protected by copyright law. Accordingly, copyright represents a 
natural lens through which to evaluate the unique social issues raised 
by the creation and dissemination of deepfakes. Part I will explain 
the technical process by which deepfakes are created and evaluate 
whether a deepfake video would constitute transformative fair use.16 
Part II will discuss both the individual and collective harms gener-
ated by the dissemination of deepfakes, including the erosion of  
our ability to differentiate authentic from inauthentic content. It will  
interrogate the historical basis for the normative claim that seeing  
is believing and problematize the role of ocularcentrism in promot-
ing both surveillance and misinformation. Part III will evaluate a  
variety of legal and regulatory measures that have been proposed  
to address the harms caused by deepfakes. The Conclusion will  
summarize the discussion contained within the Article and provide 
final thoughts. 
I. ARE DEEPFAKES PROTECTED BY FAIR USE? 
For now, this question remains theoretical; no judicial proceed-
ing has yet determined whether fair use protects the creators of deep-
fakes from copyright infringement liability. So, the question be-
comes conditional: should deepfakes be protected by fair use? 
Would such protection be consistent with the evolution of fair use 
jurisprudence and the overarching policy objectives of the copyright 
regime? These are the questions that will be explored in this section. 
A. Background 
First, it is important to understand the technical process by 
which deepfakes are created. The term deepfake—a combination of 
“deep learning” and “fake”—generally refers to synthetic content 
 
16 The copyrightability of deepfakes as transformative fair uses would be consistent both 
with the long jurisprudential history of fair use, as well as copyright law’s ostensible 
content neutrality (i.e., the availability of copyright protection should not depend on 
whether the work is a photograph of candy or an Impressionist painting). 
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created by an artificial neural network,17 but the term has colloqui-
ally been used to describe a broad spectrum of hyperrealistic con-
tent.18 At the sophisticated end of the spectrum, a recurrent neural 
network (“RNN”) can generate synthetic video footage of an indi-
vidual from an audio recording.19 The process of mapping from a 
one-dimensional (audio) signal to a three-dimensional time-varying 
image is technically challenging, but bears substantial utility.20 For 
example, an individual who is hearing-impaired could lip-read a 
synthetic video generated from over-the-phone audio.21 Researchers 
from the University of Washington trained a RNN on seventeen 
hours of video footage of President Obama delivering 300 weekly 
addresses.22 From this corpus of video footage, they extracted 1.9 
million video frames.23 For every output video frame, the RNN de-
tects mouth landmarks (18 points along the outer and inner contours 
of the lip) to generate a sparse mouth shape.24 The mouth shape and 
lower region of the face are given texture before the synthesized 
mouth region is blended into the target video.25 The target video is 
then re-timed to ensure that the natural head motion matches the in-
put audio.26 Essentially, the RNN maps mouth shapes from raw au-
dio to create synthetic footage that can be composited into the mouth 
region of a target video for photorealistic results.27 
Another sophisticated technique for generating deepfakes is a 
generative adversarial network (“GAN”), which pairs a discrimina-
tive algorithm (which predicts a label, given certain features) and a 
 
17 Yisroel Mirsky & Wenke Lee, The Creation and Detection of Deepfakes: A Survey, 
ACM COMPUTING SURVS., Jan. 2020, at 1. 
18 BRITT PARIS & JOAN DONOVAN, DEEPFAKES AND CHEAPFAKES: THE MANIPULATION OF 
AUDIO AND VISUAL EVIDENCE 10–11 (2019). 
19 Supasorn Suwajanakorn et al., Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio, 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS, July 2017, at 2. 
20 Id. at 1. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 8. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 4. 
25 Id. at 3. 
26 Id. 
27 The photorealism generated by the audio-to-shape (mouth shape) neural network can 
be observed by using a pixel difference map to compare the groundtruth video of the input 
audio and the input audio composited into the target video. 
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generative algorithm (which predicts features, given a certain la-
bel).28 For example, a discriminative algorithm would try to predict 
whether a particular email should be classified as “spam” given its 
contents, whereas a generative algorithm would try to predict the 
features of an email that had already been classified as spam.  
Deepfakes are created by the interaction of these algorithms: the 
“generator” generates artificial images that resemble the images in 
the training set, and the “discriminator” evaluates these images for 
authenticity—whether they came from the training set or not.29  
As these algorithms interact, the generator learns to create suffi-
ciently realistic images to fool the discriminator.30 
A similar deep learning technique, known as Video Dialogue 
Replacement (“VDR”), was used to create a deepfake of Mark 
Zuckerberg discussing the profitability of personal data.31 Artists  
Barnaby Francis and Daniel Howe created the deepfake using the 
proprietary algorithm of an Israeli technology start-up known as 
Canny AI.32 Canny engineers trained their deep learning algorithm 
on a twenty-one second clip from the target video as well as video 
footage of the voice actor speaking, then reconstructed the frames in 
the target video to match the facial movements of the voice actor.33 
No audio recordings of Zuckerberg were used.34 
At the other end of the deepfake spectrum, less sophisticated  
actors can create “cheap fakes,” or lower-quality deepfakes, using 
 
28 Russell Spivak, Deepfakes: The Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest Crimes, 3 
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 342–43 (2019).  
29 Id. at 343. 
30 HAI X. PHAM ET AL., GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL TALKING HEAD: BRINGING 
PORTRAITS TO LIFE WITH A WEAKLY SUPERVISED NEURAL NETWORK 4 (2018). 
31 Bill Posters, ‘Imagine This…’, VIMEO (June 12, 2019, 9:30 AM), 
https://vimeo.com/341794473 [https://perma.cc/6SGD-UWKC]. 
32 Samantha Cole, This Deepfake of Mark Zuckerberg Tests Facebook’s Fake Video Poli-
cies, VICE (June 11, 2019, 2:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/ywyxex/deepfake-
of-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-fake-video-policy [https://perma.cc/8MKA-7TD9]. 
33 Id. 
34 A comparison of the deepfake with the original (altered) video is available here: 
Multimedia LIVE, Artists Create Zuckerberg ‘Deepfake’ Video, YOUTUBE (June 13, 
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cnUd0TpuoXI [https://perma.cc/283M-
93DM]. 
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consumer-grade software or simple video-editing techniques.35  
For example, Adobe After Effects and FakeApp were used to create 
a deepfake of President Obama delivering impersonated audio by 
Jordan Peele.36 And recent cheap fakes that attracted significant at-
tention were created using simple video editing techniques. A video 
of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was slowed down to create the im-
pression of slurred speech,37 and a video of CNN correspondent Jim 
Acosta interacting with a White House intern was sped up to suggest 
physical assault.38 In each of these cases, the cheap fake was widely 
circulated on social media platforms before its falsity was recog-
nized.39 The purpose of this technical summary is simply to high-
light the breadth of digitally manipulated media that falls under the 
umbrella term “deepfake.” For the purposes of evaluating the copy-
right issues raised by deepfakes, however, this Article will focus on 
two videos created using sophisticated deep learning techniques. 
B. Kim Kardashian Deepfake 
In 2019, the same artists who created the Mark Zuckerberg deep-
fake, Barnaby Francis and Daniel Howe, posted on YouTube a deep-
fake of Kim Kardashian describing the profitability of data 
 
35 PARIS & DONOVAN, supra note 18, at 2; see, e.g., Nic and Pancho, Why Chihuahuas 
Don’t Run on the Snow?, YOUTUBE (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=JDaLg7G8rH0 [https://perma.cc/8S3W-559D]; Nic and Pancho, Is Pancho Alive? Why 
Chihuahuas Don’t Run in the Snow – The Making of, YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrWO2CHgBCU [https://perma.cc/KQZ2-PVh5-]. 
36 James Vincent, Watch Jordan Peele Use AI to Make Barack Obama Deliver a PSA 
About Fake News, THE VERGE (Apr. 17, 2018, 1:14 PM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
tldr/2018/4/17/17247334/ai-fake-news-video-barack-obama-jordan-peele-buzzfeed 
[https://perma.cc/89F4-7HGJ]. 
37 Sarah Mervosh, Distorted Videos of Nancy Pelosi Spread on Facebook and Twitter, 
Helped by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
05/24/us/politics/pelosi-doctored-video.html [https://perma.cc/M2X3-CNJ7]. 
38 Bijan Stephen, The White House Used a Doctored Video to Tell a Lie, THE VERGE 
(Nov. 8, 2018, 6:49 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/8/18076532/fake-doctored-
video-cnn-cspan-infowars-sarah-huckabee-sanders-jim-acosta [https://perma.cc/U698-
9EXY]. 
39    Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread 
Across Social Media, THE WASH. POST (May 24, 2019), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunk-
spread-across-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/Z3MY-W9AW].   
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extraction.40 Condé Nast, the copyright owner of the original video 
that had been modified to generate the deepfake,41 indicated that 
they wished to block it and YouTube removed it from all territo-
ries.42 To date, the deepfake has not been reinstated on YouTube, 
although it is still available on Instagram43 and Vimeo.44 It also ap-
pears in an exhibition at the Annka Kultys Gallery in London, titled 
“Dissimulation,” alongside deepfakes of other public figures includ-
ing Morgan Freeman and Donald Trump.45 
If Francis and Howe had challenged YouTube’s takedown of 
their Kardashian deepfake, and Condé Nast had sued for copyright 
infringement, Condé Nast would have needed to show not only that 
Francis and Howe had copied from its work, but that the copying 
rose to the level of improper appropriation.46 This is not a simple 
case of comprehensive copying: the original audio has been replaced 
with synthetic audio, and although much of the original video foot-
age has been reproduced, Kim’s facial expressions (particularly  
in the mouth region) would have been altered to match the new  
audio input. It is more likely a case of fragmented literal similarity, 
 
40 Samantha Cole, The Kim Kardashian Deepfake Shows Copyright Claims Are Not the 
Answer, VICE (June 19, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en/article/j5wngd/kim-kardashian-
deepfake-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-youtube [https://perma.cc/L2BV-BEM7]. 
41 The original video (“73 Q’s with Kim Kardashian West”) can be viewed here: 
Keeping Up with the Wests: Kim, Kanye (and Their Kids!) Answer 73 Questions, VOGUE 
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/article/73-questions-with-kim-kardashian-west 
[https://perma.cc/M9PA-RTAC]. 
42  Cole, supra note 40. It is still unclear whether Content ID automatically flagged the 
deepfake, and Condé Nast’s default response to Content ID claims is to block them, or 
whether Condé Nast itself filed a DMCA takedown notice. 
43 See Bill Posters (@bill_posters_uk), INSTAGRAM (June 1, 2019), https://www.insta 
gram.com/p/ByKg-uKlP4C/ [https://perma.cc/7FX5-NPVU]. 
44 See Bill Posters, VIMEO (July 1, 2012), https://vimeo.com/user12695491 [https://per 
ma.cc/Q84H-PXZM]. 
45 See ‘Dissimulation,’ Solo Show @ Annka Kultys Gallery, Opening Today, BILL 
POSTERS (Oct. 7, 2020), http://billposters.ch/dissimulation-solo-show-annka-kultys-
gallery-opening-today/ [https://perma.cc/6J5R-B9AX]. 
46 Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A plaintiff must 
first show that his or her work was actually copied. Copying may be established either by 
direct evidence of copying or by indirect evidence, including access to the copyrighted 
work, similarities that are probative of copying between the works, and expert testimony. 
If actual copying is established, a plaintiff must then show that the copying amounts to an 
improper appropriation by demonstrating that substantial similarity to protected material 
exists between the two works.”). 
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where only parts of the original have been reproduced. In this case, 
Condé Nast would need to show that the part(s) taken include  
copyrightable expression, and are qualitatively and quantitatively 
substantial.47 The original video footage contains expressive ele-
ments that may meet the requirements of independent creation and 
originality48—for example, the camera angles, lighting, choreogra-
phy, costume design, pacing, and the single continuous take.49  
However, the defendants could argue that these compositional 
 
47 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 797–98 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing the “fragmented literal similarity” standard but declining to apply it in cases 
of digital sampling). 
48 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as the 
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author 
(as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree 
of creativity.”). 
49 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884):  
“A photograph is the mere mechanical reproduction of the physical 
features or outlines of some object, animate or inanimate, and involves 
no originality of thought or any novelty in the intellectual operation 
connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a picture….[T]he 
process is merely mechanical, with no place for novelty, invention, or 
originality. It is simply the manual operation, by the use of these 
instruments and preparations, of transferring to the plate the visible 
representation of some existing object, the accuracy of this 
representation being its highest merit…[I]n regard to the photograph 
in question…‘[P]laintiff made the same[] entirely from his own 
original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing 
the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging 
the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said 
photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, 
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking 
the desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or 
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in 
suit.’ These findings, we think, show this photograph to be an original 
work of art, the product of plaintiff’s intellectual invention.”;  
Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chicago, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“[F]or 
photographs a copyright does not extend to the subject matter of the image itself, but 
instead protects the expression of the subject as contained in such elements of the author’s 
composition as the selection of lighting, shading, camera angle, background and 
perspective.”). 
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elements are standard video-interview conventions—scènes à 
faire—and thus not copyrightable.50 
If Condé Nast can prove that these features of the video are suf-
ficiently original to be copyrightable, the next question is whether 
the footage taken was qualitatively and quantitatively substantial.  
At this point, we need to differentiate between the footage that was 
directly reproduced in the deepfake, and the footage that was used 
to train the algorithm to synthesize Kim’s voice and facial move-
ments. With respect to the former, the deepfake appropriates 
roughly twenty-two seconds of the eleven-minute Vogue interview 
with substituted, synthetic audio and synthetic mouth footage to 
match the new audio input. Quantitatively, this segment seems in-
substantial: it represents roughly three percent of the original video. 
Qualitatively, this segment is not more important than other parts of 
the original video: Kim is answering the same kinds of trivial ques-
tions that appear in the rest of the video. A court may not find that 
this rises to the level of improper appropriation. 
The second aspect that must be considered here is the footage 
that was used to train the deep learning algorithm. Without access 
to the corpus of training footage that was used, we can only infer 
that some, or all, of the Vogue interview was used to generate syn-
thetic audio of Kim speaking and synthetic mouth footage to match. 
Reproduction of this footage within a training dataset is unlikely to 
be sufficiently transitory to fall outside the scope of copyright law.51 
However, training the algorithm on factual elements of the copy-
righted footage—e.g., the physical features of Kim’s face—does not 
 
50 See, e.g., Bill Diodata Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382, 
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[A]spects of the BDP Photograph that necessarily flow from its 
idea are not protectible. Under the doctrine of scènes à faire, elements of an image that 
flow naturally and necessarily from the choice of a given concept cannot be claimed as 
original.”); Gentieu, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (“Although in some cases the contrived 
positioning of a subject has been protected the poses are not copyrightable elements where 
they follow necessarily from the choice of the subject matter or are otherwise unoriginal.”). 
51 Only reproductions of a copyrighted work that are “copies” may constitute 
infringement, and “copies” are “fixed” in material form such that they are sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit them to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Cartoon Network 
LP, v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the copyrighted 
works were not “fixed” in the buffers for a period of more than transitory duration because 
they resided there for no more than 1.2 seconds before being automatically overwritten). 
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implicate the video’s protectable aspects,52 and such non-expressive 
use may fall within the text and data mining exception to copyright 
infringement.53 
If Condé Nast can establish improper appropriation, it then falls 
on Francis and Howe to argue that, nevertheless, they are shielded 
from copyright infringement liability by the doctrine of fair use.  
In the United States, fair use is codified as a four-factor analysis: (1) 
the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
 
52 See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s 
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2018); Benjamin Sobel, Artificial 
Intelligence’s Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 45, 51 (2017); Michael W. Carroll, 
Copyright and the Progress of Science: Why Text and Data Mining Is Lawful, 53 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 893 (2019); Benjamin Sobel, A Taxonomy of Training Data: Disentangling 
the Mismatched Rights, Remedies, and Rationales for Restricting Machine Learning, in 
A.I. & INTELL. PROP. (Reto Hilty, Jyh-An Lee, Kung-Chung Liu, eds., Oxford Univ. Press) 
(forthcoming 2020). 
53 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining 
that the use of copyrighted images for thumbnail images in a visual search engine is 
transformative because it serves an entirely different function than the owner’s original 
images, it does not supplant the need for the originals, and the use benefits the public by 
enhancing internet information gathering techniques); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 
2d 1106, 1119 (D. Nev. 2006) (ruling that a search engine allowing users to access 
copyrighted works through cached links is transformative because it serves a different and 
socially important purpose than that served by the original works); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a search engine’s 
display of thumbnail images of copyrighted works was transformative because it provided 
social benefit as an electronic reference tool); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 
562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2009) (ruling that the reproduction of student works by an anti-
plagiarism technology system, Turnitin, for the purpose of evaluating originality is 
transformative fair use); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(explaining that the reproduction of copyrighted works for Google Books, including 
snippet view, was transformative because it enabled users to search for books relevant to 
their needs and interests, and this use transformatively provided valuable information about 
the original work, rather than replicating protected expression in a manner that provided a 
meaningful substitute for the original); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 
(2d Cir. 2014) (ruling that digitization of copyrighted works to permit full-text searching 
of works, and to create accessible formats for print-disabled users is transformative fair 
use). 
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and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value 
of, the copyrighted work.54 
In relation to the first factor, there are several sub-factors to be 
considered. The first is whether Francis and Howe engaged in com-
mercial activities. It is possible that they generated some commer-
cial benefit from the display of the Kardashian deepfake in the 
Annka Kultys Gallery, and they may have earned advertising reve-
nue from the video if it had remained on YouTube. But Francis has 
consistently described his goal as artistic, namely, to use deepfakes 
to “subvert” the cultural authority of celebrities, and to expose the 
vulnerability of personal data to emerging technologies of power.55 
Francis says his artwork is influenced by Simulationism, Jean 
Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality, postmodern semiotics, and 
René Magritte’s 1929 Surrealist painting The Treachery of Im-
ages.56 The second sub-factor is an inquiry into the transformative-
ness of the impugned use.57 Although the deepfake is unlikely to 
qualify as a parody of the original work,58 its appropriation of celeb-
rity likeness to demonstrate our broader societal vulnerability to data 
exploitation and misinformation achieves a different, socially 
 
54 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
55 Charlotte Pyatt, The Art of Interrogation: An Interview with Bill Posters, JUXTAPOZ 
(June 19, 2020), https://www.juxtapoz.com/news/street-art/the-art-of-interrogation-an-
interview-with-bill-posters/ [https://perma.cc/M8TK-WHSJ]. 
56 Bill Posters (@bill_posters_uk), INSTAGRAM (June 9, 2020), https://www.insta 
gram.com/p/CBOIEh3lhPr/ [https://perma.cc/56Y5-E2KF]. 
57 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (explaining that the 
first factor in a fair use enquiry evaluates whether the new work “adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’ Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a 
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the 
fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright…the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
58 Id. at 579–81  (explaining that parody “has an obvious claim to transformative value” 
but “like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors and be judged case 
by case in light of the ends of the copyright law.”); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 
(2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]hough the satire need not be only of the copied work and may, as 
appellants urge of ‘String of Puppies,’ also be a parody of modern society, the copied work 
must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to 
conjure up the original work.”). 
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valuable purpose than the original work does.59 Additional sub-fac-
tors, such as customary use and potential bad faith by the defendant,  
are not applicable in this case and are increasingly ignored in fair  
use analyses. 
The second fair use factor—the nature of the copyrighted 
work—shifts the focus from the defendant to the plaintiff. A work 
that is unpublished, or is more creative than factual, is considered 
more deserving of copyright’s protection—courts are less likely to 
accept a fair use defense in these cases.60 Here, the original work 
was a video interview with Kim Kardashian, shot in her home in 
Hidden Hills, California.61 It follows the traditional format of 
Vogue’s “73 Questions” interviews, which are designed to provide 
a raw, unfiltered portrayal of a celebrity at home.62 The camera fol-
lows the celebrity as they walk around their house in a single con-
tinuous take, rattling off responses to rapid-fire questions.63 The im-
portance of the appearance of spontaneity (as opposed to the 
 
59 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (“[T]o 
the extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television programs, it 
yields societal benefits.”); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2013) (“If ‘the secondary 
use adds value to the original—if [the original work] is used as raw material, transformed 
in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this 
is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of 
society.’”) (quoting Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 
(2d Cir. 1998)); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A use 
is transformative if it does something more than repackage or republish the original 
copyrighted work….[A] use does not become transformative by making an “invaluable 
contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts.”…Added value or utility 
is not the test: a transformative work is one that serves a new and different function from 
the original work and is not a substitute for it.”). 
60 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Two types of distinctions as to 
the nature of the copyrighted work have emerged that have figured in the decisions 
evaluating the second factor: (1) whether the work is expressive or creative, such as a work 
of fiction, or more factual, with a greater leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use where 
the work is factual or informational, and (2) whether the work is published or unpublished, 
with the scope for fair use involving unpublished works being considerably narrower.”). 
61 Kim Kardashian West on Her Growing Family, Law School, and Her Hidden Hills 
Home, VOGUE (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/video/watch/73-questions-with-
kim-kardashian-west [https://perma.cc/7TEF-CED9]. 
62 Emilia Petrarca, 28 Pressing Questions for the Vogue’s ‘73 Questions’ Guy, THE CUT 
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.thecut.com/2019/08/vogue-73-questions-voice-behind-the-
scenes.html [https://perma.cc/TBQ5-7BH3]. 
63 Id. 
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interview feeling staged or rehearsed) means that the editing is min-
imal and no special effects are used. The more creative aspects of 
the video—the lighting, pacing, choreography, and interview ques-
tions—are not the elements that have been reproduced in Francis 
and Howe’s deepfake. Given that the video is more factual than cre-
ative, this factor is likely to weigh in favor of a finding of fair use. 
The third factor—the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used—is also likely to weigh in favor of fair use. The Kardashian 
deepfake appropriates roughly twenty-two seconds of the eleven-
minute Vogue interview, largely reproducing Kim’s visual appear-
ance, but altering her speech and some of her facial movements.64 
This segment represents roughly three percent of the original 
work.65 Additionally, the portion used does not go to the heart of the 
original: Kim merely answers the same kinds of trivial questions that 
feature in the remainder of the interview.66 Finally, the amount taken 
was necessary for the transformative purpose of the use; the inter-
view needed to appear sufficiently professional in order for the 
deepfake to be convincing.67 
The fourth and final factor assesses the effect on the potential 
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. The Kardashian deep-
fake, released in June 2019, is unlikely to have diminished the audi-
ence for the original Vogue video, which has collected over fifty-
 
64 Bill Posters (@bill_posters_uk), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/ByKg-
uKlP4C/ [https://perma.cc/DC6P-AGUH]. 
65     The original video is eleven minutes and seventeen seconds long, whereas the deep-
fake is only twenty-two seconds long. See supra notes 61, 64. 
66 Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Even if a copied portion be 
relatively small in proportion to the entire work, if qualitatively important, the finder of 
fact may properly find substantial similarity.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft, Corp., 
821 F. Supp. 616, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“[Q]uantitatively insignificant infringement may 
be substantial if the material is qualitatively important to plaintiff’s work.”). 
67 See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114–16 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“‘[T]he parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of the original to make the 
object of its critical wit recognizable.’…“‘[O]nce enough has been taken to assure 
identification,’ as plainly occurred here, the reasonableness of taking additional aspects of 
the original depends on the extent to which the ‘overriding purpose and character’ of the 
copy ‘is to parody the original,’ and ‘the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market 
substitute for the original.’ That approach leaves the third factor with little, if any, weight 
against fair use so long as the first and fourth factors favor the parodist. Since those factors 
favor fair use in this case, the third factor does not help Leibovitz, even though the degree 
of copying of protectable elements was extensive.”). 
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three million views on YouTube since it was released in April 
2019.68 Fans seeking an intimate portrayal of Kim Kardashian’s 
home and family life would not be discouraged from watching 
Vogue’s interview by Francis and Howe’s deepfake. Conversely, 
given the revenue generated by their celebrity coverage, Condé Nast 
is unlikely to ever develop a market for unflattering celebrity deep-
fakes, nor is this a use that they would likely license. Accordingly, 
the negligible effect of the Kardashian deepfake on the potential 
market for, or value of, Vogue’s interview, would likely weigh in 
favor of a finding of fair use. Given the four factors analyzed above, 
Francis and Howe would likely be protected by fair use in any cop-
yright infringement proceeding brought by Condé Nast. 
C. Jay-Z/Billy Joel Deepfake 
A similar copyright claim was filed against another celebrity 
deepfake in early 2020. In April, Jay-Z’s agency, Roc Nation LLC, 
filed copyright claims against two YouTube videos containing deep-
fake audio of Jay-Z reciting a Shakespearean soliloquy (“To Be or 
Not To Be”)69 and Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire.”70 The 
creator of the deepfake audio is an artist known as Vocal Synthesis 
whose YouTube channel is dedicated to the creation of deepfake  
audio generated from unlikely audio-textual pairings (for example, 
George W. Bush performing 50 Cent’s “In Da Club”).71 Each  
deepfake audio is created by feeding a corpus of audio samples and 
transcripts into Google’s open-source neural network system, 
Tacotron 2.72 Constructing a training set for a new synthetic voice 
 
68 Vogue, 73 Questions with Kim Kardashian West (ft. Kanye West), YOUTUBE (Apr. 
11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QaZ93sibpk0&ab_channel=Vogue 
[https://perma.cc/8c2Z-9RFG]. 
69 Andy Baio, With Questionable Copyright Claim, Jay-Z Orders Deepfake Audio 
Parodies off YouTube, WAXY BLOG (Apr. 28, 2020), https://waxy.org/2020/04/jay-z-
orders-deepfake-audio-parodies-off-youtube/ [https://perma.cc/6E4N-HX83]. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.; see also Nick Statt, Jay Z Tries to Use Copyright Strikes to Remove Deepfaked 
Audio of Himself from YouTube, THE VERGE (Apr. 28, 2020, 6:38 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/28/21240488/jay-z-deepfakes-roc-nation-youtube-
removed-ai-copyright-impersonation [https://perma.cc/7BGA-5LPE]. 
72 Baio, supra note 69. For a technical description of Tacotron 2, see JONATHAN SHEN, 
ET AL., NATURAL TTS SYNTHESIS BY CONDITIONING WAVENET ON MEL SPECTROGRAM 
PREDICTIONS (2018). 
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and training the model to generate it requires over twelve hours of 
work, depending on the quality of the audio and the transcript.73 
YouTube initially removed both videos, but later reinstated them  
after reviewing Roc Nation’s DMCA takedown requests and finding 
them to be incomplete.74 
The Vocal Synthesis case bears many of the same markings as 
the Kardashian deepfake, but is complicated by the entirely syn-
thetic nature of the audio output, and the additional copyrightability 
of the input text. Shakespeare’s soliloquy is firmly in the public do-
main, however Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire” is still pro-
tected by copyright.75 Accordingly, even if Vocal Synthesis had paid 
the mechanical licensing fee required to produce a cover of “We 
Didn’t Start the Fire,”76 he would also require a synchronization li-
cense in order to combine his synthetic audio with visual media on 
YouTube.77 For now, we will focus on the viability of the copyright 
claim made by Roc Nation LLC. It is not known precisely which 
Jay-Z songs were fed to the algorithm, but it seems safe to assume 
that Roc Nation LLC owns the copyright, for each song, in both the 
composition and the sound recording.78 Importantly, none of the 
songs are directly reproduced; once the algorithm has learned Jay-
Z’s speech patterns, it generates entirely new, synthetic audio.79  
In other words, the “sound” of Jay-Z’s voice is digitally simulated.80 
The reproduction of each song within the algorithm’s training 
 
73 Baio, supra note 69.  
74 See Statt, supra note 71.  
75 Hamlet, Prince of Denmark was published by William Shakespeare in 1603; under 
U.S. copyright law, works published before 1925 are generally in the public domain. Billy 
Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire” was released in 1989, and the copyright term under U.S. 
law is the life of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
76 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
77 The “cover license” available under 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) allows the licensee to make 
and distribute a sound recording of the licensed musical composition upon the payment of 
a small royalty but it does not include the right to synchronize the composition with visual 
media (as occurs on YouTube), and the new arrangement is not permitted to “change the 
basic melody or fundamental character of the work.” 
78 See, e.g., Waite v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 3d 430, 438 n. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020) (“[N]oting that since sound recordings earned copyright protection in 1972, 
‘virtually all contracts’ between artists and recording companies include ‘work made for 
hire’ provisions.” (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03 (2019))). 
79 Baio, supra note 69. 
80 Id. 
2021] OCULARCENTRISM AND DEEPFAKES 1059 
 
dataset would likely fall within the text and data mining exception 
to copyright infringement.81 And the exclusive rights in sound re-
cordings do not extend to the creation of sound recordings which 
imitate or simulate the original.82 In order for Roc Nation to estab-
lish copyright infringement (in the form of comprehensive nonliteral 
similarity) it would first need to establish the copyrightability of Jay-
Z’s speech patterns, which seems unlikely.83 
Even if Roc Nation could establish copyright infringement, the 
highly transformative nature of the deepfakes would likely militate 
against any minimal commercial benefit derived from ad revenue on 
YouTube.84 Certainly, the second and third factors would weigh 
against a finding of fair use; Jay-Z’s songs are highly creative and 
we can assume that the model was trained on a large corpus of full-
length songs.85 However, the fourth factor, like the first, would 
weigh in favor of a finding of fair use. Neither of the Jay-Z deep-
fakes would adversely affect the potential market for, or value of, 
the original Jay-Z songs and they do not represent a market that Roc 
Nation would likely develop (or license) in the future. Given these 
 
81 Posters, supra notes 43–44. 
82 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). 
83 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) for a summary of the idea-expression dichotomy, which 
renders facts uncopyrightable; see also Sobel, supra note 52.  
84 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”); Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. 
ComicMix LLC, 256 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106, 1109 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (“[I]n the present case 
there is no question that Defendants created their work for profit. Although this weighs 
against Defendants in this factor, its weight is slight given both the transformative nature 
of the work…and the fact that Boldly does not supplant the market for Go! or the other 
relevant Dr. Seuss works.”) (“This case presents an important question regarding the 
emerging ‘mash-up’ culture where artists combine two independent works in a new and 
unique way…if fair use was not viable in a case such as this, an entire body of highly 
creative work would be effectively foreclosed.”). 
85 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Notwithstanding 
the reasonable implication of Factor Three that fair use is more likely to be favored by the 
copying of smaller, rather than larger, portions of the original, courts have rejected any 
categorical rule that a copying of the entirety cannot be a fair use. Complete unchanged 
copying has repeatedly been found justified as fair use when the copying was reasonably 
appropriate to achieve the copier’s transformative purpose and was done in such a manner 
that it did not offer a competing substitute for the original…. As with HathiTrust, not only 
is the copying of the totality of the original reasonably appropriate to Google’s 
transformative purpose, it is literally necessary to achieve that purpose.”). 
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considerations, Vocal Synthesis’ Jay-Z deepfakes would likely be 
protected by fair use. 
D. Democratizing Creative Production  
The evolution of fair use jurisprudence—and its focus on trans-
formativeness—seems consistent with the protection of the artistic 
deepfakes described above. However, the more difficult question is 
whether the protection of deepfakes is consistent with the overarch-
ing policy goals of the copyright regime. Although the Constitution 
gave Congress the power to distribute time-limited monopolies to 
authors and inventors to “promote the progress of science and useful 
arts,”86 opinions on the proper purpose of copyright still vary 
widely. There are those who emphasize the importance of rewarding 
creators with property interests (fairness theory), while others prior-
itize the protection of the psychic bond between creator and creation 
(personality theory).87 Some scholars emphasize the importance of 
incentivizing the production and distribution of intellectual products 
as public goods (welfare theory), and still others believe that copy-
right’s purpose is to sustain a just and attractive culture that contrib-
utes to human flourishing (cultural theory).88 
Of these groups, proponents of the cultural theory of copyright 
law are most likely to advocate for the protection of artistic deep-
fakes such as those described above. The ability of artists like Fran-
cis, Howe, and Vocal Synthesis to subvert and remix popular culture 
promotes diverse self-expression, and public discourse. Rather than 
remain passive consumers of cultural works, digital technology al-
lows these individuals to become active co-creators by transforming 
copyrighted works in unconventional ways.89 This decentralization 
 
86  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
87 See generally William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS 
IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY (Stephen Munzer et al. eds., 2001). 
88 Id. 
89 See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic 
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 236 
(1996); Stacey Lantagne, Mutating Internet Memes and the Amplification of Copyright’s 
Authorship Challenges, 17 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (2018); Cathay Smith, Beware the 
Slender Man: Intellectual Property and Internet Folklore, 70 FL. L. REV. 601 (2018); Niva 
Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User Rights Approach, in COPYRIGHT 
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of the meaning-making process disrupts the commercial paradigm 
of tightly controlled creativity,90 and dismantles institutional hierar-
chies of knowledge production and ownership.91 It also provokes 
important social discourse about who we are as a society, and who 
we want to be. All of these benefits would be chilled by the specter 
of a copyright infringement suit. And as evidenced by the removal 
of the Kardashian deepfake from YouTube, many creators will not 
challenge a wrongful takedown of their content. If the reproduction 
and manipulation of copyrighted content for the purpose of deepfake 
creation was not shielded by fair use, copyright infringement liabil-
ity could present a nontrivial barrier to the creation and dissemina-
tion of artistic deepfakes. 
II. Individual and Collective Harms  
A. Our Vulnerability to Misinformation  
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is important to distinguish 
between the individual and collective harms generated by the dis-
semination of deepfakes.92 An individual whose likeness has been 
appropriated for deepfake pornography, or other similarly harmful 
content, may suffer severe emotional distress, psychological harm, 
and reputational injury. On the other hand, the collective harms gen-
erated by deepfakes tend to be exacerbations of existing social prob-
lems. Online harassment of women, for example, is as old as the 
 
LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth Okediji ed., 2017); LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); 
Teresa Scassa, Acknowledging Copyrightʹs Illegitimate Offspring: User-Generated 
Content and Canadian Copyright Law, in  THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE 
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
(Michael Geist ed., 2013). 
90 See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto 
for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 924–26 (2009). 
91 See, e.g., David J. Gunkel, What Does it Matter Who Is Speaking? Authorship, 
Authority, and the Mashup, POPULAR MUSIC AND SOCIETY, at 71 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
92 See supra Introduction. Note also the harms associated with the threat of such 
dissemination, for the purposes of blackmail and other kinds of exploitation. 
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internet itself,93 but the ease and accessibility of deepfake pornogra-
phy has increased the severity of this harassment and tied it explic-
itly to the exploitation and stigmatization of female sexuality. Such 
harassment ultimately reduces female participation in digital public 
spaces,94 and degrades public discourse. Efforts to reduce such har-
assment require not only the removal of (individual) pornographic 
deepfakes, but broader measures aimed at the roots of systemic  
misogyny, and sexism. 
Another collective harm associated with the dissemination of 
deepfakes is a reduction in our capacity to differentiate authentic 
from inauthentic content. Existing scholarship is rife with inflam-
matory claims that hyperrealistic deepfakes will undermine public 
safety, compromise international relations, and jeopardize national 
security.95 Deepfakes are certainly capable of all these things, but so 
are many other kinds of misinformation. And it is this root cause—
our societal vulnerability to misinformation—that must be ad-
dressed. Have we fostered such uncritical reliance on video footage 
that we would make significant decisions on the basis of uncorrob-
orated evidence? Has societal trust in public institutions fallen so 
significantly that a single deepfake could cause mass unrest? And if 
this is the case, how did we get here? Like online harassment, our 
vulnerability to misinformation has deep roots. Human society has 
long grappled with inauthenticity in different forms. For as long as 
 
93 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of 
Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 383 (2009); Alice E. Marwick & Robyn 
Caplan, Drinking Male Tears: Language, the Manosphere, and Networked Harassment, 
18 FEMINIST MEDIA STUDIES 543 (2018); Jessica Vitak et al., Identifying Women’s 
Experiences with and Strategies for Mitigating Negative Effects of Online Harassment, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE 
WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING 1231 (2017). 
94 For a description of incidents concerning Rana Ayyub, an investigative journalist in 
India, and media critic Anita Sarkeesian, see Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos are Being 
Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women: ‘Everybody is a Potential Target,’ THE 
WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/ 
12/30/fake-porn-videos-are-being-weaponized-harass-humiliate-women-everybody-is-pot 
ential-target/ [https://perma.cc/ 3QGB-2LWU]; see also Marjan Nadim & Audun Fladmoe, 
Silencing Women? Gender and Online Harassment, SOC. SCI. COMPUT. REV. 245 (2019). 
95 See Danielle Citron & Robert Chesney, Deepfakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, 
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1784 (2019) (“Foreign policy 
could be changed in response to convincing deep fakes and forgeries.”). 
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people have valorized certain things—original artwork, designer 
handbags, wild ginseng96—inauthentic versions have existed to 
meet excess demand,97 and copyright law has been used to remove 
some of those counterfeits, as discussed in Part I. As it turns out, 
knowledge of the external world is also a highly-valued commodity, 
and so we are plied with different versions of it, each competing for 
ascendance.98 Ultimately, this competition is about power—about 
who gets to decide what is “real” and what is “fake”—and once we 
understand this, we can recognize deepfakes as simply the latest 
weapon in that struggle for epistemological supremacy. To over-
come our vulnerability to misinformation, then, we have to combat 
not only deepfakes, but the modern conditions that have nurtured 
them, including: shortened attention spans, a 24-hour news cycle, 
widespread dependence on digital networks (heightened by corona-
virus quarantine restrictions), increasing social isolation, low levels 
of media literacy, social media echo chambers, political polariza-
tion, and a loss of trust in both scientific and political institutions.99 
Strengthening our capacity to identify (and counter) misinformation 
will require engagement on all of these fronts, not just the sporadic 
take-down of individual deepfakes.  
 
96 See, e.g., Q. Lu et al., Study on Nondestructive Discrimination of Genuine and 
Counterfeit Wild Ginsengs Using NIRS, 59 EUR. PHYSICAL J. APPLIED PHYSICS, July 2012, 
at 1. 
97 See, e.g., David Lowenthal, Counterfeit Art: Authentic Fakes, 1 IJCP 79, 79 (1992) 
(“[C]ounterfeiting is relative; measures of truth vary with time and place. What is fake or 
forged for some is ‘real’ or authentic for others…. The roots of originality and 
counterfeiting, of truth and falsehood, are inextricably intertwined.”); John Henry 
Merryman, Counterfeit Art, 1 IJCP 27, 28–29 (1992) (discussing whether a perfect 
counterfeit, if indistinguishable from the original, is as good as the original, and should be 
valued as such). 
98 For philosophical meditations on metaphysical uncertainty, see e.g., RENÉ 
DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993); Peter 
Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism, 87 PHIL. REV. 154 (1978); Manley Thompson, 
Book Reviews, 94 ETHICS 143 (1983) (reviewing HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND 
HISTORY (1981)). 
99 See, e.g., Stephan Lewandowsky et al., Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and 
Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era, 6 J. APPLIED RSCH. IN MEMORY & COGNITION 353 
(2017); Alexei Abrahams & Gabrielle Lim, Repress/Redress: What the “War on Terror” 
Can Teach Us About Fighting Misinformation, THE HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 
MISINFORMATION REV., July 22, 2020, at 1(3). 
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B. The History of Ocularcentrism  
Another factor which allows deepfakes to exploit our vulnera-
bility to misinformation is the persistence of the normative claim 
that seeing is believing.100 The epistemological priority of sight is 
deeply embedded in the Western history of ocularcentrism. The an-
cient Greeks prioritized sight over other senses due to its simultane-
ity and perceived objectivity; the ability to avoid direct interaction 
with the object of your gaze was believed to enhance the neutrality 
of your perception.101 The ocularcentrism of early Greek thought 
was also present in medieval Christian society, which used images 
to convert new believers and educate the faithful.102 In a largely  
illiterate society, biblical events were visually represented in stained 
glass windows, bas-reliefs, frescoes, altarpieces, and wooden carv-
ings.103 During the Renaissance, these lessons about the persuasive 
quality of visual representation were reapplied for secular pur-
poses.104 Vision “became the dominant sense in the modern world, 
even as it came to serve new masters.”105 
Renaissance artists used the illusion of perspective to render 
three-dimensional space on a flat, two-dimensional canvas.106 The 
flattened compositions of medieval art were replaced by the illusion 
of depth,107 and the many vantage points of medieval scenes were 
replaced by a single, sovereign eye.108 This “monocular” or fixed 
point of beholding the world obscured the bodies of the painter and 
the viewer, thereby removing their emotional involvement in the  
depicted scene and giving it the illusion of detached reality.109 Per-
spectival art was so widely adopted that its technique of visual 
 
100 See, e.g., Christopher J. Buccafusco, Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or 
Keeping Visual Evidence in Perspective, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 609, 646 (2004) (“Once the 
public has become convinced of the transparency of a given medium, it will no longer 
scrutinize the products of that medium for inconsistencies and biases.”). 
101  JAY, supra note 4, at 23. 
102 Id. at 30. 
103 Id. at 30. 
104 Id. at 32. 
105 Id. at 32. 
106 Id. at 35. 
107 Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 30–31.  
108 JAY, supra note 4, at 36. 
109 Id. at 36. 
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representation became synonymous with vision itself.110 Cartesian 
perspectivalism reflected the Western Enlightenment ideals of  
empirical, scientific observation of the external world, detached 
from the corrupting influence of the sensual body.111 Sight was crit-
ical for the scientific project of the early naturalists, meticulously 
observing, measuring, and classifying different specimens so that 
‘seeing’ from a distance become synonymous with scientific 
knowledge.112 Probing vision characterized the early scientific  
revolution, liberating humans from “blind obedience” to the “voices 
of the past” (the interpreters of religious texts), and allowing them 
to observe the natural world for themselves, especially with the  
invention of optical instruments.113 
In the early nineteenth century, the invention of the camera fur-
ther secured the primacy of vision. The introduction of the daguerre-
otype in 1839 produced a “cult of images” which flooded mass ad-
vertising, in addition to artistic and scientific books.114 This led to 
the “democratization of visual experience,” or the incorporation of 
“low” subjects in the canon of what could be visually represented.115 
The daguerreotype was heralded as a direct transcription of reality, 
“produced by the operation of natural laws and not by the hand of 
man.”116 The “natural” chemical process of sensitizing a silver-
coated copper plate to light through iodine and bromine exposure 
(and suspending the light-exposed plate over a dish of heated 
 
110 Id. at 54; see, e.g., Buccafusco, supra note 100, at 639, 645 (“The use of linear 
perspective, as standardized by the Renaissance painters, has disembodied the creative 
mechanism of image construction and presented images as direct transcriptions of the 
externally visible world. By erasing the human creator, the process of image creation looks 
less like a system of communication than a natural process for the gathering of visual data, 
and the image created is thought of not as a sign, but as a perception….A work in linear 
perspective is assumed to be a direct and truthful depiction created by an automatic and 
natural process the success of which need not be questioned.”); see also Lev Manovich, 
The Automation of Sight: From Photography to Computer Vision, in ELEC. CULTURE 230 
(Timothy Druckery ed., 1996). 
111 JAY, supra note 4, at 67; see also Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 29–30.  
112 Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 30. 
113 JAY, supra note 4, at 39-40. 
114 Id. at 73. 
115 Id. 
116 Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of 
Analogy, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN 1, 16 (1998). 
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mercury) allowed Nature to simply “reproduce herself.”117 But it did 
not take long for the manipulability of photography to be realized. 
At the 1855 Universal Exposition in Paris, the audience was shocked 
to learn that photographs could be retouched or combined to form a 
composite image.118 In 1869, photographer William H. Mumler was 
charged with fraud for selling “spirit” photographs of deceased  
individuals that had been produced using double exposures.119  
In 1870, Eugène Appert’s fabricated photographs of violent anti-
government protestors (“Communards”) were used as state propa-
ganda.120 And in 1899, Le Siècle published a frontpage article de-
scribing “The Lies of Photography.”121 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the hegemony of 
Cartesian perspectivalism and other “spectatorial” epistemologies 
began to wane in favor of alternative approaches that exposed the 
“culturally mediated” nature of sight.122 Twentieth-century France 
was characterized by “antiocular discourse” and the “antiretinal” art 
of Marcel Duchamp.123 Philosophers began to problematize the un-
mediated, atemporal, and decorporealized notion of perspective,124 
arguing instead that every viewpoint was value-laden, rather than 
detached, and projective, rather than merely receptive.125 The de-
clining ontological primacy of sight was accelerated by the First 
World War and the Western Front’s “bewildering landscape of in-
distinguishable, shadowy shapes, illuminated by lightning flashes  
of blinding intensity, and then obscured by phantasmagoric, often  
gas-induced haze.”126 The unreliability of sight, and the ease of vis-
ual disorientation, heightened the importance of non-ocular senses.  
The Surrealists, who were deeply affected by their wartime experi-
ences,127 sought to suppress the rational self through “sensual 
 
117 Id.  
118 JAY, supra note 4, at 75. 
119 Mnookin, supra note 116, at 14.  
120    JAY, supra note 4, at 81. 
121 Id. at 75. 
122 Id. at 95. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 112. 
125 Id. at 113. 
126 Id. at 130. 
127 Id. at 138. 
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derangement.”128 They challenged the integrity of visual experience 
through techniques such as collage, frottage, decalcomania, and 
fumage.129 
Increasing awareness of the subjectivity of vision was reflected 
in Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology of sight, which displayed a 
deep distrust of visual illusions and the “treachery” of being defined 
by the gaze of others.130 Sartre emphasized the way in which the 
objectification of the gaze sustained racist and imperialist domina-
tion.131 Similarly, Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected the epistemol-
ogy of the “objective spectator” whose vision was “wholly inde-
pendent of his constitutive powers.”132 Rather, visual experience 
was subjective and constructed from “orders of signification” in 
which humans were deeply embedded.133 Merleau-Ponty’s phenom-
enology of subjectivity insisted that the observer was always part of 
the observed—embodied in the world, rather than disembodied and 
disinterested.134 Similarly, Jacques Lacan emphasized the social 
construction of the visual field, and the sum of discourses that occu-
pied the space between the subject and the world.135 Meanwhile, 
Michel Foucault and Guy Debord highlighted the ways in which  
ocularcentrism promoted institutions of surveillance, spectacle, and 
social control.136 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault described the 
ubiquitous, disciplining gaze of the Panopticon, and its ceaseless 
surveillance.137 Looking was a form of power, exerted by the subject 
upon the object, with detached epistemological authority.138 
 
128 Id. at 141. 
129 Id. at 145. 
130 Id. at 166. 
131 Id. at 174. 
132 Id. at 178. 
133    Id. 
134 Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 37. 
135 Id. at 32. 
136 JAY, supra note 4, at 229. 
137 Id. at 240. 
138 Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 29.  
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, antiocular discourse shifted its 
attention to the “material apparatuses” of photography and film.139 
Roland Barthes understood the allure of photography: “You are the 
only one who can never see yourself except as an image; you never 
see your eyes unless they are dulled by the gaze they rest upon the 
mirror or the lens . . . even and especially for your own body, you 
are condemned to the repertoire of its images.”140 Barthes railed 
against its distorting effects: “[O]nce I feel myself observed by the 
lens, everything changes: I constitute myself in the process of ‘pos-
ing,’ I instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform 
myself in advance into an image.”141 Barthes emphasized the para-
doxical contrast between the photograph’s denotative capacity to 
imitate the world (its “analogical perfection”), and its second-order 
connotative capacity to signify (its semiotic overlay).142 
Like photography, film also promoted the “ideology of the visi-
ble,” or the hegemony of the eye.143 By the early 1960s, the Barthe-
sian “death of the author”144 was mirrored in the “death of the au-
teur” within film, and semiological efforts to expose the devices of 
cinema’s “reality effect.”145 Part of film’s analogical power 
stemmed from the movement of images and its simulation of “atem-
poral instantaneity.”146 The monocular perspective of the camera 
mimicked the Cartesian perspectivalism of traditional painting, 
which privileged the “fixed, monologic eye,” and disincarnated the 
painter and viewer in order to give the appearance of detached 
 
139 JAY, supra note 4, at 260; see also Mnookin, supra note 116, at 2 (noting that the 
photograph has “long been perceived to have a special power of persuasion, grounded both 
in the lifelike quality of its depictions and in its claim to mechanical objectivity”); ROLAND 
BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA (Richard Howard trans., 1st American ed. Hill & Wang 1981); 
Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in 
ILLUMINATIONS (Harry Zohn trans., Hannah Arendt ed., 1969); Lorraine Daston & Peter 
Galison, The Image of Objectivity, 40 REPRESENTATIONS, SPECIAL ISSUE: SEEING AUTUMN 
81 (1992); SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY (1977). 
140 JAY, supra note 4, at 265. 
141 Id. at 267. 
142 Id. at 262. 
143    Id. at 273. 
144 ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT (Stephen Heath trans., Hill & Wang 1978).  
145 JAY, supra note 4, at 271. 
146 Id. at 303. 
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observation.147 Rather than conveying multiple, and perhaps differ-
ent, points of view, the moving camera erased any “dispersed and 
contradictory subjectivities” to produce a singular, disembodied 
gaze.148 The viewer identified with the omniscient camera eye,  
producing a hyperreal sense of reality in which subject and object 
collapse into a “state of oneness with the world.”149 The cinematic 
screen functioned as a mirror, reinforcing the viewer’s specular 
identity and the Lacanian role of mirror reflection in “the visual con-
stitution of the self.”150 Film theorists such as Christian Metz, who 
worked to expose the ideological underpinnings of the cinematic  
apparatus, emphasized the object’s disavowal of awareness of being 
viewed as a key feature of film’s “reality effect.”151 By the end of 
the twentieth century, the eye had been deconstructed as an “inno-
cent” medium of knowledge,152 and philosophers emphasized the 
“culturally mediated” nature of visual perception.153 
The history of Western ocularcentrism helps to explain both the 
persistence of the normative claim that seeing is believing, and the 
 
147 Id. at 275. 
148 Id. at 275. 
149 Id. at 277. 
150 Id. at 205, 278. 
151 Id. at 272. 
152 Id. at 348. 
153 Id. at 95. There is longstanding legal insecurity regarding the admissibility and 
evocative power of visual evidence as reflected in the iconography of the goddess 
Justicia—she is blindfolded to prevent the seduction of images and dispassionately deliver 
impartial verdicts. See, e.g., The Photograph as a False Witness, 10 VA. L.J. 644, 645–46 
(1886); H. Vogel, Photography and Truth, 6 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 262, 262 (1869); H.J. 
Morton, The Trials of the Photographer, 2 PHILA. PHOTOGRAPHER 36, 36 (1865); Judicial 
Photography, 15 PHOTOGRAPHIC J. 107, 107 (1872); Buccafusco, supra note 100, at 617; 
Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? The Challenges of Images to the Law, in LAW AND THE 
IMAGE, THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 78 (Costas Douzinas & 
Lynda Nead eds., 1999); Craig Murphy, Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments: 
Fact, Fantasy and Admission Standards, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 163 (1990); John 
Selbak, Comment, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of Computer Generated 
Animation in the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 337, 357 (1994); Elan E. Weinreb, Note, 
‘Counselor, Proceed With Caution’: The Use of Integrated Evidence Presentation Systems 
and Computer-Generated Evidence in the Courtroom, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 395–96 
(2001). 
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variety of visual technologies that have exploited this norm.154  
Contextualizing deepfakes within this visual history helps us to con-
ceive them as simply a new iteration of a very old problem. Yet,  
few techniques of visual manipulation have been met with such  
outrage and condemnation. So, what makes deepfakes different?  
The answer may lie in the synchrony of audio and visual elements. 
A Photoshopped image of an Iranian missile launch, for example, 
appeals only to a viewer’s static sight.155 But a deepfake of President 
Obama introducing a deep learning course at MIT,156 or of Tom 
Cruise golfing on TikTok,157 appeals both to our visual and auditory 
senses in a manner that seems to defy deception. We are watching 
them speak, as we are hearing their words. The synchrony of audio 
and visual elements implicates not just one sense, but two. Psycho-
logical research on the emotional responses produced by unimodal 
(auditory or visual) and bimodal (auditory and visual) sensory 
 
154 In 1935, Leni Riefenstahl transfigured the “reality” of the Third Reich, while 
apparently recording it, for her Nazi propaganda film, Triumph of the Will. In 2008, the 
media arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Sepah News, published a photograph of the 
simultaneous launch of four missiles, which appeared on the cover of the Chicago Tribune, 
the Financial Times, and the Los Angeles Times. In fact, only three missiles launched that 
day; the fourth had been digitally added. Earlier this year, U.S. President Donald Trump 
posted an inauthentic video on Twitter that had been manipulated to falsely represent a 
CNN broadcast. These examples, while anecdotal, highlight the longstanding vulnerability 
of visual media to manipulation, even without the use of deepfake technology. See, e.g., 
Ken Kelman, Propaganda as Vision: Triumph of the Will, LOGOS 2.4 (Fall 2003); Hany 
Farid, Seeing Is Not Believing, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/seeing-is-not-believing [https://perma.cc/ 
MFK8-ZYUK]; Kate Conger, Twitter Labels Trump Tweet About ‘Racist Baby’ as 
Manipulated Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
06/18/technology/trump-tweet-baby-manipulated.html [https://perma.cc/4E26-F5VA]. 
155 See, e.g., MIA FINEMAN, FAKING IT: MANIPULATED PHOTOGRAPHY BEFORE 
PHOTOSHOP 5 (2012); Mike Nizza & Patrick Whitty, In Image of Iran’s Power, There’s 
Less Than Meets the Eye, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/07/11/world/middleeast/11missile.html [https://perma.cc/93LD-RTG9]. 
156 Alexander Amini, Barack Obama: Intro to Deep Learning MIT 6.S191, YOUTUBE 
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l82PxsKHxYc [https://perma.cc/ 
V3AB-3JDW]. 
157    Alex Hern, ‘I Don't Want to Upset People’: Tom Cruise Deepfake Creator Speaks 
Out, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2021/mar/05/how-started-tom-cruise-deepfake-tiktok-videos 
[https://perma.cc/2RRH-FMEB]; James Vincent, Tom Cruise Deepfake Creator Says 
Public Shouldn’t Be Worried About ‘One-Click Fakes,’ THE VERGE (Mar. 5, 2021), 
https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/5/22314980/tom-cruise-deepfake-tiktok-videos-ai-im-
personator-chris-ume-miles-fisher [https://perma.cc/8EAD-PJXT].  
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experience suggests that the combination of sensory elements af-
fects our response to individual stimuli.158 Our perception of events 
or objects in the external world depends upon their stimulation of 
our senses; for example, we experience a passing car through sight 
and sound.159 Deepfakes harness the hyperrealism of multisensory 
experience, and our familiarity with the co-occurrence of speech 
sounds, and visible changes in an individual’s articulatory facial 
musculature.160 The audiovisual congruence of deepfakes therefore 
increases their persuasive effect on the viewer, relative to unimodal 
techniques of visual media manipulation, such as Photoshop. 
As deepfakes test the limits of society’s tolerance for visual  
manipulation, they force us to confront our history of ocularcentrism 
and to interrogate the utility of the normative claim that seeing is 
believing. Our overreliance on the visual world as our primary 
source of knowledge and meaning has had far-reaching conse-
quences.161 For example, the overwhelming credibility of visual  
evidence has incentivized widespread state surveillance for evi-
dence of wrongdoing,162 as evidenced by the ubiquity of CCTV 
cameras.163 The power to observe—to make visible—is the power  
to control, and modern surveillance technologies extend the domi-
nance of the disembodied gaze.164 Continuous state surveillance,  
in turn, erodes public trust in institutions and exacerbates our 
 
158 Annabel J. Cohen, How Music Influences the Interpretation of Film and Video: 
Approaches from Experimental Psychology, in PERSPECTIVES IN SYSTEMATIC MUSICOLOGY 
15–36 (R. A. Kendall & R. W. H. Savage eds., 2005). 
159 Id. at 16. 
160 Id. 
161 Lauwrens, supra note 4, at 26.  
162 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON, LONDON 
96 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); Apple Igrek, Review: Gary 
Shaprio, Archaeologies of Vision: Foucault and Nietszche on Seeing and Saying, 3 
FOUCAULT STUD. 132 (2005) (reviewing GARY SHAPIRO, ARCHAEOLOGIES OF VISION: 
FOUCAULT AND NIETZSCHE ON SEEING AND SAYING (2005)). 
163    See, e.g., Kelly Gates, The Cultural Labor of Surveillance: Video Forensics, Com-
putational Objectivity, and The Production of Visual Evidence, SOC. SEMIOTICS, Mar. 12, 
2013, at 242 (2013).  
164 Christopher Taylor, Visual Surveillance: Contemporary Sociological Issues at 227 
(1997) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nevada) (on file with University Libraries, 
University of Nevada Las Vegas); see also Donncha Kavanagh, The Limits of 
Visualisation: Ocularcentrism and Organization, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
VISUAL ORGANIZATION (Emma Bell et al., eds., 2013). 
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vulnerability to misinformation. Conversely, of course, ocularcen-
trism is also instrumentalized against the state by its citizens to ex-
pose wrongdoing by public officials.165 The nationwide protests 
against police brutality triggered by the footage of George Floyd’s 
murder reflect this phenomenon.166 If bystander footage of this kind 
could be dismissed as a deepfake, criminal acts might go unpun-
ished,167 and social movements might falter. This alone provides a 
compelling justification for maintaining the credibility of visual ev-
idence.168 
And yet—it would be naïve to rest our hopes on visual evidence 
alone. From Selma’s “Bloody Sunday” (1965),169 to the beating of 
Rodney King (1991),170 and the murders of Eric Garner (2015),171 
and George Floyd (2020),172 the history of visual evidence demon-
strates that filming police violence does not end police violence. 
The ubiquity of body cameras—and bystanders with smartphones—
 
165    See, e.g., Sam Gregory, Cameras Everywhere: Ubiquitous Video Documentation of 
Human Rights, New Forms of Video Advocacy, and Considerations of Safety, Security, 
Dignity, and Consent, 2 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 191, 196–98 (2010). 
166 See, e.g., Wesley Morris, The Videos That Rocked America. The Song That Knows 
Our Rage, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/arts/george-
floyd-video-racism.html [https://perma.cc/K9CS-YHC9]; Alex Altman, Why the Killing of 
George Floyd Sparked an American Uprising, TIME (June 4, 2020, 6:49 AM), 
https://time.com/5847967/george-floyd-protests-trump/ [https://perma.cc/V88P-KEUG]. 
167    See, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Vital Role of Bystanders in Convicting Derek 
Chauvin, The New Yorker (April 21, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-col-
umnists/the-vital-role-of-bystanders-in-convicting-derek-chauvin 
[https://perma.cc/8WJ3-6NEK].  
168 For a discussion of “the Liar’s Dividend,” see Chesney & Keats Citron, supra note 3, 
at 888. 
169 Aniko Bodroghkozy, How the Images of John Lewis Being Beaten During ‘Bloody 
Sunday’ Went Viral, THE CONVERSATION (July 23, 2020), https://theconversation.com/ 
how-the-images-of-john-lewis-being-beaten-during-bloody-sunday-went-viral-143080 
[https://perma.cc/3KH8-4LQK]. 
170 Frank Tomasulo, ‘I’ll See It When I Believe It’: Rodney King and the Prison-House 
of Video, in THE PERSISTENCE OF HISTORY: CINEMA, TELEVISION, AND THE MODERN EVENT 
74 (Vivian Carol Sobchack ed., 1996). 
171 See, e.g., Katie Benner, Eric Garner’s Death Will Not Lead to Federal Charges for 
N.Y.P.D. Officer, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/ 
16/nyregion/eric-garner-case-death-daniel-pantaleo.html [https://perma.cc/GE8P-SXYJ]. 
172 See, e.g., Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-invest 
igation.html [https://perma.cc/UXN6-M4ET]. 
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has not altered police behavior.173 Nor has careful, frame-by-frame 
analysis of body camera footage overcome decades of qualified im-
munity jurisprudence.174 As Ethan Zuckerman explains, the idea that 
police violence, like other information problems, could simply be 
solved by an increase in data flows is a “techno-utopian fantasy.”175 
Individuals “armed with images” have not been able to effect sys-
temic change.176 This is not to say that credible video footage bears 
no utility whatsoever; rather, that focusing disproportionately on ac-
quiring (and disseminating) visual evidence of social problems can 
distract us from dismantling the (less visible) structures of power 
that benefit from their persistence.177 The science of climate change, 
for example, has been so fiercely repudiated by powerful industries 
that even the evidence of their own eyes (e.g., the charred Califor-
nian coastline) has not convinced climate change deniers other-
wise.178 In other words, information alone, unharnessed to structures 
of power, cannot effect social change.179 
If deepfakes force us to interrogate our relationship with visual 
evidence, and the social utility of ocularcentrism, such conversa-
tions are long overdue. Are we still willing to accept the price of 
ocularcentrism, and if we are, what additional safeguards must be 
 
173 Ethan Zuckerman, Why Filming Police Violence Has Done Nothing to Stop It, MIT 
TECH. REV. (June 3, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/03/1002587/ 
sousveillance-george-floyd-police-body-cams/ [https://perma.cc/2S46-2FX4]. 
174 See id.; see, e.g., John P. Gross, Qualified Immunity and the Use of Force: Making 
the Reckless into the Reasonable, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 67, 71 (2017); Lindsay de 
Stefan, No Man Is Above the Law and No Man Is Below It: How Qualified Immunity 
Reform Could Create Accountability and Curb Widespread Police Misconduct, 47 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 543, 544 (2017); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1817 (2018). 
175 Zuckerman, supra note 173. 
176 Id. 
177 For a discussion of the role of invisibility in human life, see, e.g., Koji Komatsu, Not 
Seeing is Believing: The Role of Invisibility in Human Lives, 51 INTEGRATIVE PSYCH. & 
BEHAV. SCI. 14 (2017). 
178 See, e.g., Peter Baker et al., As Trump Again Rejects Science, Biden Calls Him a 
‘Climate Arsonist,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/ 
15/us/elections/biden-calls-trump-a-climate-arsonist-as-the-president-denies-the-science-
of-wildfires.html [https://perma.cc/J5KC-ZT5J]. 
179 Zuckerman, supra note 173. 
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introduced to preserve the credibility of visual evidence?180 What 
investments must be made to improve media literacy,181 and 
strengthen authentication protocols? How will we maintain the cred-
ibility of visual evidence amid the increasing ubiquity of visual  
manipulation technologies, such as video-editing filters on Insta-
gram and Tik Tok?182 Unfortunately, as Part III will demonstrate, 
current legislative initiatives avoid these existential questions, and 
focus instead on developing Band-Aid solutions to the distribution 
of specific deepfakes. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The public and private sectors have proposed a variety of 
measures to address the unique challenges posed by deepfakes. The 
public sector offers legal remedies, while the private sector offers 
policy and technological solutions. Beginning with the public sec-
tor, the first thing to note is that any sweeping legislative prohibition 
 
180 Human society has long introduced safeguards to preserve the credibility of visual 
evidence, rather than dismiss the utility of visual evidence altogether. See, e.g., Jacqueline 
Marks Bibicoff, Seeing Is Believing? The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 11 SAN FERN. VAL. L. REV. 95, 98 
(1983). 
181 See, e.g., Rachel Rodgers et al., When Seeing Is Not Believing: An Examination of the 
Mechanisms Accounting for the Protective Effect of Media Literacy on Body Image, 81 
SEX ROLES 87, 87–96 (2019) (discussing how skepticism concerning the extent to which 
images portray reality can help protect female adolescents from the harmful effects of thin-
ideal internalization); Colin C Barton, Critical Literacy in the Post-Truth Media 
Landscape, 17 POL’Y FUTURES IN EDUC. 1024 (2019). 
182 See, e.g., Jiayang Fan, China’s Selfie Obsession, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/18/chinas-selfie-obsession 
[https://perma.cc/HY7T-U9PD] (“In the same way that you would point out to your friend 
if her shirt was misbuttoned, or if her pants were unzipped, you should have the decency 
to Meitu her face if you are going to share it with your friends….”); Jia Tolentino, The Age 
of Instagram Face, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 12, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/decade-in-review/the-age-of-instagram-face 
[https://perma.cc/Z39K-CXE8]; Orla Pentelow, FaceTime Timothée Chalamet Thanks to 
the Instagram Filter You’ve Been Dreaming Of, BUSTLE (May 15, 2020), 
https://www.bustle.com/p/your-facetiming-timothee-chalamet-fantasy-just-came-true-
via-this-instagram-filter-22906687 [https://perma.cc/G23F-P6WU]; Christianna Silva, A 
Theater Student Gets Supersized Attention After Superhero Video Goes Viral, NPR (July 
5, 2020, 7:53 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/05/887310065/a-theater-student-gets-
supersized-attention-after-superhero-video-goes-viral [https://perma.cc/QM4C-WNP2]. 
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on the dissemination of deepfakes would be incompatible with the 
free speech protections of the First Amendment.183 Since 1964, the 
Supreme Court has only strengthened protection for falsehoods,184 
including intentional falsehoods, which cannot be restricted unless 
they cause serious harm that cannot be avoided through more 
speech-protective means—e.g., counter speech.185 And as Cass 
 
183 There are exceptions from First Amendment protection for “obscenity,” See, e.g., 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483–88 (1957) (“[T]he unconditional phrasing of the 
First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance….[I]mplicit in the history of 
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social 
importance….We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech or press….However, sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is 
material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) 
whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest…(b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.”). However, most pornography (and thus deepfake 
pornography) would be unlikely to meet the (elusive) legal definition of obscenity. See 
generally Douglas Harris, Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot 
Protect You, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 99–127 (2019); Spivak, supra note 28, at 364. 
184 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–81 (1964) (noting that the 
constitutional protection of the First Amendment “does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, 
or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’…That erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate, and…must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have 
the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive’….The constitutional guarantees require, 
we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–
348 (1974) (“The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to 
protect speech that matters….[T]he States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts 
to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private 
individual.…We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States 
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”) (noting that private 
individuals will not have to meet the higher standard of “actual malice” that public officials 
must meet). 
185 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725–29 (2012) (“The First Amendment 
requires that the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech at issue be “actually 
necessary” to achieve its interest….There must be a direct causal link between the 
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented….The Government has not shown, and 
cannot show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest….The remedy 
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Sunstein explains, there are many reasons to protect falsehoods: 
state characterizations of “truth” and “untruth” may not always be 
trustworthy; fear of punishment for falsity will inevitably chill some 
truthful expression; engagement with false statements can provoke 
more informed discourse; falsehoods reveal the spectrum of social 
perspective on an issue; and driving falsehoods underground can  
inadvertently increase their power.186 After Alvarez, the Supreme 
Court is likely to permit only carefully tailored restrictions on  
certain kinds of harmful deepfakes.187 
The legal remedies available to individual victims of deepfakes 
fall within civil or criminal liability regimes. With respect to civil 
liability, assuming the creator of the deepfake is identifiable and  
located within U.S. jurisdiction, the plaintiff may sue for defama-
tion,188 publicity in a false light, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress,189 wrongful appropriation of another’s likeness,190 or the 
right of publicity.191 Alternatively, if the defendant is unidentifiable, 
 
for speech that is false is speech that is true….In addition, when the Government seeks to 
regulate protected speech, the restriction must be the ‘least restrictive means among 
available, effective alternatives.’”). 
186 Cass Sunstein, Falsehoods and the First Amendment, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 388–426 
(2020). 
187 Chesney & Keats Citron, supra note 3, at 889. 
188 With respect to defamation, most deepfake videos would likely constitute libel 
(“printed”) rather than slander (“transitory”) and would probably rise to the level of “actual 
malice” required for torts involving public figures. The type of proof necessary will depend 
on statutory libel requirements, which vary by state. See Spivak, supra note 28, at 367, 370.  
189    This generally requires proof of “extreme and outrageous conduct.” See, e.g., Taliani 
v. Resurreccion, 115 N.E.3d 1245, 1254 (Ill. App. 3d. 2018) (“To prevail on a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove the following three el-
ements: (1) that the defendant’s conduct was truly extreme and outrageous, (2) that the 
defendant either intended that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress or knew 
that there was a high probability that his conduct would do so, and (3) that the defend-
ant’s conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress.”); Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g 
Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974). 
190 For non-celebrities, the tort of wrongful appropriation of the name or likeness of 
another may be helpful, but the victim would need to demonstrate economic purpose, for 
example, use of the victim’s likeness to endorse or advertise a product. Where no monetary 
value is derived, it may be difficult for a deepfake victim to satisfy the elements of wrongful 
appropriation. See Spivak, supra note 28, at 381.  
191 The right of publicity is generally only useful to celebrities and other public figures 
who can clearly demonstrate the commercial value in the exploitation of their name and 
likeness. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664, 669 (D.N.J. 2010), 
and the many statutes that provide an exception for “newsworthy” material. 
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located outside U.S. jurisdiction, or financially unable to meet  
a judgment sum, the plaintiff might consider suing the platform  
on which the deepfake was distributed. Although platforms are 
largely shielded from liability for user-generated content under  
the “super immunity”192 offered by Section 230 of the Communica-
tions Decency Act, there are exceptions to this immunity for content  
that violates federal criminal law, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, or intellectual property law.193 Some scholars have  
also advocated amending Section 230 to extend platform liabil- 
ity to harmful deepfakes, similar to the 2018 amendment for sex  
trafficking.194 
Each of these civil remedies has strengths and weaknesses which 
have been extensively catalogued elsewhere195 and do not bear  
repeating here. The only point I wish to make is that any successful 
use of copyright law to remove revenge pornography does not indi-
cate its use in the removal of pornographic deepfakes.196 The two 
 
192 See Chesney & Citron, supra note 3, at 890.  
193 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e). With respect to the intellectual property exception, courts are 
still divided as to whether the text of the statute (“Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property”) refers to state and federal 
law, or just federal law. At multiple points in section 230(e), Congress specified whether 
it intended a subsection to apply to state or federal law, so some scholars argue that if 
Congress intended the statute to refer only to federal law, it would have specified as such. 
On this basis, they argue that the exception covers all IP laws, including state laws relating 
to the right of publicity. Accordingly, a deepfake victim could argue that the immunity 
provided by section 230 is pierced by a state right of publicity, as an IP right. See Almeida 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here appears to be no 
dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual property right.”); see also Spivak, 
supra note 28, at 394–95.  
194 See, e.g., Citron & Chesney, supra note 95, at 1799 (“Section 230 should be amended 
to allow a limited degree of platform liability relating to deep fakes.”). 
195 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 183, at 99; Spivak, supra note 28, at 364; Elizabeth 
Caldera, Reject the Evidence of Your Eyes and Ears: Deepfakes and the Law of Virtual 
Replicants, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 177, 178 (2019); Jessica Ice, Defamatory Political 
Deepfakes and the First Amendment, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 417, 419 (2019); Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and Deep Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2018); 
Rebecca Delfino, Pornographic Deepfakes: The Case for Federal Criminalization of 
Revenge Porn’s Next Tragic Act, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 891 (2019). 
196 See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. 
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422 (2014); Kaitlan M. Folderauer, Not All Is Fair (Use) in Love 
and War: Copyright Law and Revenge Porn, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 321 (2015); Ann Bartow, 
Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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situations are very different. Revenge pornography generally in-
volves the nonconsensual release of explicit photographs, previ-
ously shared between intimate sexual partners.197 If the victim took 
those photographs, they generally own the copyright in them.198  
Pornographic deepfakes, on the other hand, involve substantial al-
terations to existing footage in order to create a completely new 
work.199 This type of transformative use is likely permitted under 
copyright law, despite the fact that it is obviously egregious in the 
pornographic context.200 This is because emotional, psychological, 
and/or reputational harms are not the intended targets of copyright 
relief; copyright’s function as the engine of free expression is to pro-
mote the creation and publication of expressive works by protecting 
the commercial interests of the author.201 Habitual filing of copy-
right claims to remove pornographic deepfakes would, over time, 
normalize the misuse of copyright law to remove any unwanted 
deepfake, and the specter of a copyright claim would chill the crea-
tion of beneficial deepfakes. To address the very real and serious 
harms caused by pornographic deepfakes, Congress should create 
new statutory remedies specifically designed to help individual vic-
tims. At the federal level, a bill has been introduced that would cre-
ate private rights of action for individual deepfake victims.202 At the 
state level, both California and New York have passed legislation 
 
197 Levendowski, supra note 196.  
198 Id. 
199 Harris, supra note 183, at 109.  
200 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned 
the new language in which their author spoke.…At the other end, copyright would be 
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they 
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to 
say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value- —and the taste of any public is 
not to be treated with contempt.”). 
201 See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2015). 
202 Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping Exploitation 
Subject to Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. § 2(g) (2019).  
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allowing individual victims of nonconsensual deepfake pornogra-
phy to sue for damages.203 
With respect to criminal liability, assuming the availability of 
both law enforcement resources and prosecutorial will, a deepfake 
creator could be prosecuted for violating federal cyberstalking 
laws,204 certain impersonation crimes,205 incitement,206 election-re-
lated deception,207 or the impersonation of public officials, or can-
didates for office.208 At the federal level, a bill has been introduced 
that would criminalize the production and distribution of porno-
graphic deepfakes, as well as deepfakes designed to cause violence 
or physical harm, incite conflict, interfere in an election, or facilitate 
criminal conduct.209 At the state level, Virginia and Texas have 
passed laws criminalizing nonconsensual deepfake pornography,210 
and deepfakes that interfere with elections,211 respectively. Massa-
chusetts has proposed the criminalization of the creation or distribu-
tion of deepfakes intended for use in otherwise criminal or tortious 
conduct.212 Many of these bills require proof of intent, for example, 
that the defendant intended to “humiliate or otherwise harass” the 
victim of the pornographic deepfake.213 Such requirements may 
shield these bills from First Amendment scrutiny.214 
 
203 See A.B. 602, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); A.B. 5605-C, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
204 See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A and analogous state statutes. 
205 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (2008) (“Impersonates another by 
communication by internet website or electronic means with intent to obtain a benefit or 
injure or defraud another, or by such communication pretends to be a public servant in 
order to induce another to submit to such authority or act in reliance on such pretense.”). 
206 See 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1). 
207 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109(1)(a) (“No person shall knowingly make, 
publish, broadcast, or circulate or cause to be made, published, broadcasted, or circulated 
in any letter, circular, advertisement, or poster or in any other communication any false 
statement designed to affect the vote on any issue submitted to the electors at any election 
or relating to any candidate for election to public office.”) and analogous state statutes. 
208 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912; H.R. 3230. 
209 H.R. 3230 § 2(f). 
210 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (West 2019). 
211 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004(d) (West 2019). 
212  H. 3366, 191st Gen. Ct. (Ma. 2019). 
213 See, e.g., H.R. 3230; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2. 
214 See, e.g., Louis Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech 
Made on Social Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 88 (2017). 
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Meanwhile, the private sector response has largely taken the 
form of policy and technological initiatives. Given the significant 
portion of social and political discourse that occurs on digital plat-
forms, the policies enacted by these platforms (unconstrained by the 
First Amendment) are highly consequential. In January 2020, Face-
book announced that it would remove any “misleading manipulated 
media” that had been edited or synthesized “in ways that aren’t ap-
parent to an average person and would likely mislead someone” and 
was produced by “artificial intelligence or machine learning.”215 Fa-
cebook clarified that this policy would not extend to “parody or sat-
ire, or video that has been edited solely to omit or change the order 
of words.”216 There are three problems with this approach. First, a 
blanket ban of this kind would chill the creation and distribution of 
artistic deepfakes of the kind produced by Barnaby Francis, Daniel 
Howe, and Vocal Synthesis, unless they were classified by Face-
book as parody or satire, and it’s not clear that Facebook should 
wield such normative authority. Secondly, for those concerned with 
reducing the spread of misinformation, the limited application of the 
policy to deepfakes produced by “artificial intelligence or machine 
learning” seems both arbitrary and ineffective. As we have seen, 
“cheap fakes” such as the slurred video of Nancy Pelosi also carry 
significant capacity for harm. Thirdly, reliance on the civic-minded 
whims of private enterprise to staunch the spread of misinformation 
has proven to be an unsustainable strategy.217  
Facebook has consistently been unwilling to sacrifice profit in order 
to play the arbiter of truth.218 As its user base increasingly trends 
 
215 Monika Bickert, Enforcing Against Manipulated Media, FACEBOOK (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/enforcing-against-manipulated-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/F55T-FSSW]. 
216    Id. 
217 See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel & Davey Alba, Trump’s Disinfectant Talk Trips Up Sites’ 
Vows Against Misinformation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/04/30/technology/trump-coronavirus-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/3C5J-
6X3A]. 
218 See, e.g., Greg Bensinger, Does Zuckerberg Understand How the Right to Free 
Speech Works?, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/ 
opinion/facebook-civil-rights-audit.html [https://perma.cc/6Z2P-B26K]. 
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conservative,219 Facebook has been reluctant to remove any con-
servative misinformation, even going so far as to label climate 
change denial “opinion” rather than factually inaccurate.220 
Twitter’s deepfake policy is more nuanced. In February 2020, 
the platform announced that it may label any media that had been 
“significantly and deceptively altered or fabricated,” and may re-
move such media if it had been shared in a deceptive manner, and 
was likely to impact public safety or cause serious harm.221 Twitter 
did not limit the application of its policy to deepfakes that had been 
created using artificial intelligence or machine learning, thereby fa-
cilitating the removal of cheap fakes. It also listed several factors 
that it would consider in its evaluation of the likelihood that the con-
tent would cause harm: threats to physical safety of a person or 
group; risk of mass violence or widespread civil unrest; and threats 
to privacy or free expression or participation in civic events.222 The 
limited application of the policy to content likely to cause harm pro-
tects artistic and other beneficial deepfakes. Like Twitter, 
YouTube’s approach to manipulated media is also conditioned on 
the risk of harm. Rather than imposing a blanket ban on deepfakes, 
the platform prohibits content “that has been technically manipu-
lated or doctored in a way that misleads users (beyond clips taken 
out of context) and may pose a serious risk of egregious harm.”223 
 
219 See, e.g., Nick Bilton, How Facebook Became the Social Media Home of the Right, 
VANITY FAIR (June 5, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/06/how-facebook-
became-the-social-media-home-of-the-right [https://perma.cc/AW5F-HDBA]. 
220 Veronica Penney, How Facebook Handles Climate Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES (July 
14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/climate/climate-facebook-fact-check 
ing.html [https://perma.cc/L2K3-YWW6]; see also Craig Silverman et al., ‘I Have Blood 
on My Hands’: A Whistleblower Says Facebook Ignored Global Political Manipulation, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 14, 2020, 3:36 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ 
craigsilverman/facebook-ignore-political-manipulation-whistleblower-memo [https://per 
ma.cc/8E3E-FGFF]. 
221 Yoel Roth & Ashita Achuthan, Building Rules in Public: Our Approach to Synthetic 




223 Spam, Deceptive Practices & Scams Policies, YOUTUBE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801973?hl=en&ref_topic=9282365 
[htpps://perma.cc/8TGH-5ADW]. 
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Artistic deepfakes that acknowledge their inauthenticity will not be 
affected by this policy. 
The private sector has also developed a variety of technological 
means to detect deepfakes, for example, by searching for spatial ar-
tifacts (e.g., blending boundary, fore/background contrast, incon-
sistent head poses), and temporal artifacts (e.g. emotional discrep-
ancies, irregular blinking patterns or pulse signal, viseme/phoneme 
asynchrony, flickers and jitter).224 Microsoft’s Video Authenticator, 
launched in September 2020, is designed to help news outlets and 
political campaigns identify, using a confidence score, the likeli-
hood that media has been artificially manipulated, by detecting the 
blending boundary of a deepfake and subtle fading or greyscale el-
ements.225 Artifact-based detection can be evaded, however, by mit-
igating individual flaws within a deepfake, just as deep learning de-
tection methods can be overcome by adversarial machine learn-
ing.226 For this reason, deepfake detection technologies should be 
supplemented by anti-tampering protection measures, and content 
provenance and authenticity frameworks.227 Blockchain and other 
distributed ledger technologies may be able to guarantee the prove-
nance, authenticity, and traceability of digital content using smart 
contracts.228 Microsoft has developed authentication tools that ena-
ble content producers to add digital hashes and certificates to content 
metadata, which can be read and verified by browser extensions.229 
Congress has also proposed legislation that would increase funding 
for efforts by the Department of Defense to counter manipulated 
media content,230 award prizes for the development of deepfake 
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detection technology,231 and require the National Science Founda-
tion (“NSF”) to support research on digital forensic tools designed 
to detect deepfakes.232 
CONCLUSION 
It has not been my intention to downplay the severity of the 
harms caused by deepfakes, nor to undermine the legitimacy of pub-
lic and private sector responses to the unique challenges they pose. 
Rather, my goal is to temper alarmist claims of “epistemological an-
archy”233 by reminding readers, firstly, that visual evidence has been 
vulnerable to manipulation for as long as visual technology has ex-
isted, and secondly, that our insistence that seeing should be believ-
ing has harmful as well as beneficial consequences. The advent of 
deepfakes has exposed the vulnerabilities of an ocularcentric society 
and reinforced the importance of building trust in public institutions,  
authenticating and corroborating sources, and investing in media lit-
eracy and education. The social issues that are exacerbated by deep-
fakes—including misogyny and misinformation—have deep roots, 
and short-term efforts to stifle the distribution of deepfakes should 
not distract us from the larger project of dismantling the (invisible) 
social structures that support them. Nor should widespread condem-
nation of pornographic and other harmful deepfakes prompt the mis-
use of copyright law to remove deepfakes from digital platforms. 
Deepfake technology bears significant capacity for social good, and 
this capacity should not be stifled by unfounded fearmongering. 
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